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Abstract 
Globally aquaculture is seen as an increasingly important component in the quest to achieve food 
security in light of such drivers as a decline in capture fisheries, an expanding global population and 
climatic change.  However, it is widely recognised that in many countries poor regulation acts as a 
major constraint on the development of the sector.  This paper, using the Irish oyster industry as an 
example highlights not only how regulation can be seen as a significant source of risk in itself to 
aquaculture, but also how it also increases the level of other risks to the successful development of 
the sector.  Mechanisms for increasing the resilience of the sector by dealing with these risks are 
reviewed and two possible approaches (supporting collaborative action and backing selected 
producers) to strengthening the structure of the industry are considered.  Both approaches are 
shown to have strengths and weaknesses 
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 Regulatory Failure and Risk in Aquaculture: A case study of the Irish Oyster Industry 
 
Introduction  
Globally aquaculture is seen as an increasingly important component in the quest to achieve food 
security in light of such drivers as a decline in capture fisheries, an expanding global population and 
climatic change (FAO, 2014).  At national and local levels it can also be a significant source of income 
and employment, often in economically disadvantaged (peripheral) rural areas (Jesperson et al, 
2014).   Whilst in Asia there has been marked growth in aquaculture, in many other regions it is 
failing to meet its potential (Jesperson et al, 2014; Knapp, 2012; European Parliament (EP), 2009; 
Howlett and Rayner 2004; Brummett et al, 2008).   
Although several factors have been identified as to why the expected growth in aquaculture 
production has not occurred in a number of regions, a key feature has been a failure to overcome 
regulatory challenges (OECD, 2009; EP, 2009; Knapp, 2012).  Many of the challenges facing 
aquaculture are similar to its land based equivalent, but its reliance on the aquatic environment adds 
another level of complexity.  As noted by Van Houtte (2001) ‘Aquaculture, in common with other 
food production activities, interacts with the environment, as it is dependent on land, water and 
aquatic species, and thus causes environmental change.  Production must also lead to a product safe 
for human consumption by domestic and foreign consumers. Therefore its development and 
management is likely to fall within the scope of various legislations and the expertise of various 
institutions’  
Nowhere is this more apparent than within the European Union where there are multiple 
governance institutions both at EU and Member State level.  As the EP (2009) note ‘At the EU level, 
for example, several DGs within the Commission have competence over some matter relating to 
aquaculture policy … At the Member State level, policy, law-making and administration may be split 
not only across different sectoral bodies but also across different administrative levels (e.g. central 
government, regional government and local government)’   They proceed to note that the ‘obvious 
risk from the involvement of many bodies … is that policies, regulation, administration and 
enforcement can come into conflict or overlap, or at least appear to do so. ’ EP (2009)  
Beyond the EU, Nash (2004), Knapp (2012) and Howlett and Rayner (2004) highlight the challenges 
facing governance in a North American context.    For example Knapp (op. cit) outlines five main 
reasons why the industry has failed to reach its potential within the US, a number of which relate to 
the regulatory environment.  Most specifically, he argues that the governance system for leasing and 
regulation is structurally biased against US marine aquaculture (citing for example, an outright ban 
on fish farms in Alaska).  In Canada, Howlett and Rayner (op. cit) provide evidence of the conflicts 
between federal and state regulations as well as regulatory barriers that range from the extremely 
hostile to more subtle challenges for the sector.   Moreover, Hishamunda et al (2014) note there are 
17 federal departments and agencies with responsibilities for aquaculture in Canada, in addition to 
departments of the 10 provinces.   Brummet et al (2008) track the erratic development of the sector 
in Africa and again highlight regulatory difficulties as playing a significant role. 
In terms of regulation as a perceived risk factor to aquaculture businesses, separate European 
studies have highlighted that regulatory risk ranked high amongst those faced by producers.    For 
example, Ashan and Roth (2009) noted ‘…fish farmers perceive the risk of changes to different rules 
and regulations to be one of the most important risk sources for their business.’   They also note that 
‘The risk of frequent changes of policy and thereby regulations on their production poses a high risk 
for continuity‘.  Similarly Bergfjord (2009) found that ‘institutional’ risk factors (market regulation, 
area access, changes to licensing system, environmental regulations or animal health regulations) 
were viewed as highly significant by fish farmers in Norway.   
Whilst regulation as a risk factor has received some attention in the literature, few studies have 
examined how it interacts with other risks identified as being important for aquacultural producers.   
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold.  First, it aims to provide a clear 
example of the significant impact regulatory failure has on the development of aquaculture within 
the context of oyster production in Ireland.  Second, it highlights how regulatory failure often 
exacerbates the risks that producers face and reduces their ability to either prevent, mitigate, or 
cope with these risks.   Based on the analysis the paper considers how improved regulatory 
structures may enhance the resilience of the sector enabling it to deal better with these risks and to 
take advantage of the opportunities that exist.     
Irish oyster production is chosen as a case study because it represents a microcosm of the global 
situation.     Ireland has a number of advantages in terms of its physical geography for the 
production of oysters.   These include a suitable climate and a large number of coastal sites suited to 
oyster production.  This means that, in physical terms at least, it could support a major growth in the 
industry.  In addition, significant market opportunities exist, particularly in Asia.  This has led a 
number of recent high profile reports to highlight the potential for significant growth in the Irish 
aquaculture sector and the contribution that it can make to food production and economic 
development in rural areas of Ireland (for example see Harvesting our Ocean’s Wealth, 2012; CEDRA, 
2014).   Vega et al (2014) and Renwick (2015) highlight the potential economic gains from achieving 
growth in the sector, however, the oyster industry continues to face significant regulatory challenges 
that interact with financial and biological threats to constrain growth.   
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the current 
structure and economics of the oyster sector in Ireland and outlines the history behind the current 
challenges with the oyster production licensing system in Ireland.  The methodological approach is 
then outlined and this is followed by presentation of the results.  Next, the discussion section draws 
on the findings to consider possible measures and overall strategies that could increase the 
resilience of the sector. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.   
Background to the Irish Oyster Industry 
Oyster production in Ireland can be viewed as both an old and a new industry.   Old, because there is 
a long history of the harvesting of native oysters in Ireland. New, because the commercial farming of 
Oysters (mainly Gigas) is much more recent, beginning mainly in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Total production of Oysters was estimated to be nearly 9500 tonnes in 2014 (BIM).   With the 
exception of 2012, where there were particular problems along the West coast due to an algal 
bloom, production has grown steadily and was 28 per cent higher in 2014 when compared with 
2010.1  Oyster production occurs in 11 counties in Ireland, however, two counties, Waterford and 
Donegal, together account for around 60 per cent of Irish production in terms of tonnage. 
In general Oyster farming is small scale in nature, for example seventy-five per cent of enterprises 
had five or fewer employees.  However, it is estimated that as much as 70 per cent of Ireland’s 
production comes from just 15 enterprises (BIM, 2012).   In 2014, an estimated 1,200 people 
                                                          
 
attained some form of employment (equating to 551 full time equivalent (FTE) positions) from 
Oyster production, reflecting the labour intensive nature of the enterprise. this.  In line with the 
growth in output, total employment (in terms of FTEs) increased by 20 per cent between 2010 and 
2014.     
The value of production has grown significantly in the last few years reaching just over €40 million in 
2014, a near doubling of the 2010 value.  A combination of significantly higher prices as well as 
increased production are responsible for the growth in output during this period.  The Irish industry 
benefited from a series of events in France that led to a significant reduction of domestic supply and 
a marked increase in the price of Oysters (Girard and Pérez Agúndez, 2014).   Retail prices in France 
rose from just under €8 per kilo in 2009 to nearly €12 by 2013 and this change was reflected in 
wholesale prices in Ireland.    
A key feature of the Oyster industry is that it is export focused with the vast majority of production 
being consumed outside of Ireland.  Globally, the Oyster industry is dominated by France and this is 
the major destination for Irish exports, accounting for an average of 88 per cent of exports between 
2012 and 2014. Much smaller quantities are exported to other parts of Europe including the UK and 
the Netherlands and to markets in Asia.  The influence of France goes beyond being the main market 
for Irish oysters.  French producers are heavily involved in production in Ireland.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that around 25 per cent of production is undertaken directly by French producers with 
another 25 per cent produced ostensibly by Irish producers but under direct contracts to the French.  
This suggests that either directly or indirectly French interests control around half of Irish 
production.  
According to EU figures, there was a transformation in terms of profitability of the sector over the 
period 2008 to 2012 in line with the strong prices being received from the main market of France.   
Gross Value Added increased from around 5 million to nearly 30 million and in terms of Net Profit 
the sector moved from a loss of 6.4 million in 2008 to a surplus of 18 million in 2012.  Although 
detailed financial figures are not available for 2013 and 2014, given the increased output, this trend 
in profitability is likely to have been maintained. 
Taken at face value, it may appear that the industry is one that is currently thriving with output, 
employment and profitably all increasing markedly in recent years.  However, these aggregate 
figures hide considerable variation in performance between years both across regions and within 
particular businesses.  It also fails to take into account the possible constraints on growth and their 
impact.  
A key issue within the Irish Oyster industry in the regulatory environment within which it operates, 
in particular, the dysfunctional nature of the licensing system (for example see IFA, 2014).  Box 1 
briefly summarises the background to the complex licensing issue. 
  
 Box 1: The licensing issue 
Initially as the oyster farming industry began to develop (in the 1980s and 1990s) licenses were 
allocated and the industry began to grow on the foreshores around Ireland.   Problems began 
because under EU legislation (and in particular directives such as the Birds and Habitats Directive2) 
each country had to designate a certain proportion of its land area as conservation areas.  However, 
due to the characteristics of the Irish landscape (for example, the low levels of forest cover), it was a 
challenge for the Irish Government to reach the required level of designation.  This led to a delay in 
designating areas, which in turn led to the situation where they were facing daily fines from the EU 
for non-compliance.  Under this pressure the decision was made to designate large areas of the 
foreshore as Special Areas of Conservation (SACs).  Whilst this was a short term solution to the 
immediate problem it had major implications for the oyster industry.   The difficulty was that 
licenses to operate had already been issued in these areas and the industry had developed.  
Environmental groups argued that these licenses did not take proper account of Natura 2000 
requirements and that the Irish Government were delinquent due to the fact that this was an 
infraction of the rules.  The European Commission agreed with the Environmental groups that the 
Irish Government had not followed the proper procedures.  In December 2007, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union ruled that Ireland had not complied with the Habitats and Birds Directives by 
not requiring appropriate assessment of aquaculture activities in or adjacent to Natura 2000 areas. 
By extension, the judgement also impacted on Ireland’s licensing of fisheries in such areas. The 
judgement relating to aquaculture was one part of a larger judgement relating to implementation of 
the Directives by the State and this meant that in December 2007 the licensing system came to a 
grinding halt.   
The required procedures meant that within the designated areas there was a need to carry out an 
Appropriate Assessment (AA, under Article 6), but in turn, an AA required that, for each area under 
consideration, Specific Conservation Objectives (SCO) had to be set.  However these were non-
existent as the underlying baseline research had not been undertaken – for example the undertaking 
of habitat surveys.  Therefore to begin to rectify the situation these three steps had to be followed.  
First, there was a need to undertake baseline research; second SCOs could then be set and; third, 
based on these an AA could be undertaken which could assess the environmental impact of oyster 
farming against the SCOs and see whether or not it maintained favourable conservation status.  The 
main problem is that this is a very time consuming procedure and, in part due to the economic crisis 
of 2008, there have been relatively few resources to undertake this.   
However, the problem was that many of the licenses were issued under the 1997 Aquaculture act 
(which was amended in 1999) and these were for a duration of 10 years only.   Therefore they began 
to expire, but new licenses could not be issued as the above environmental procedures had not been 
completed.  
The problem was recognised and, as a fix, Section 19A4 to the 1997 act was introduced.  This stated 
that if an operator had a license under the 1997 act and had made an application to operate, then 
they could continue until the proper procedures had been completed.  However, this was not a 
license as such.  So while they could produce they had weak property rights over production. 
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 The environmental directives were later collectively known as Natura 2000 
 Method  
The study involved both primary data collection and detailed analysis of secondary data.  More 
specifically the approach adopted involved:  
• A review of relevant literature   
• Compilation and analysis of available statistics   
• Semi-structured face to face interviews with 11 oyster producers from across Ireland 
• In-depth interviews with industry representatives    
 
The interviewees for the study were chosen from a list of producers provided by the Irish Shellfish 
Association, the main body representing Irish oyster farmers.   From the list provided, the selection 
process was weighted towards the larger producers (who account for the bulk of Irish production) 
but did include smaller producers as well those involved in traditional native oyster production to 
ensure a range of views were captured.   In addition, the interviewees were selected to reflect the 
geographical spread of oyster production across Ireland.  The interviews were undertaken during the 
summer of 2015.  Altogether 14 producers were contacted and all agreed to participate, however,  
due to logistical challenges associated with scheduling visits, only 11 farms were in the final sample.  
Whilst individual production levels vary from year to year, the selected farms together account for 
roughly a third of the overall production in Ireland.   The interviews covered the following general 
areas: economics of production; ambitions for growth; possible constraints to growth; the regulatory 
environment; environmental concerns; collaboration and co-operation and; the role of research and 
development.     
The approach adopted here differs from a number of studies that have been conducted on risk in 
agriculture, and the relatively few that have been conducted in aquaculture which have used a 
relatively standard questionnaire to assess views on the importance of risks on a likert scale  (see for 
example Meuwissen et al, 2001; Bjerkeret, 2009; Ashan et al, 2011).  This study is more qualitative in 
nature and the issues are drawn out through a semi-structured interview around the development 
of the business and its opportunities and constraints. Whilst this does not formally ‘quantify’ the 
extent of the risks, it allows for a deeper understanding of the business and the strategies adopted 
to deal with the risks. It also allows for more detailed exploration of how the various risks interact.   
Results 
The review of the literature and the interviews with industry experts and producers led to the 
identification of a number of key risks (Table 1) in addition to those that emerge from the uncertain 
licensing environment.  Whilst there are a number of ways that risks facing primary food producers 
can be classified (see for example Harwood et al, 1999; Meuwissen et al, 2001; OECD, 2010), for 
ease of exposition, the risks identified in this study are broadly classified into regulatory, financial 
(including market) and biological risks.  The risks within the individual categories are and the nature 
of the interaction between regulatory and other risks is presented. 
 
 
 
  
Table 1: Summary of key areas of risk to oyster businesses in Ireland 
Classification Examples of Risk Source 
Regulatory   Dysfunctional licensing system Land (water)-use conflicts 
 Excessive number and lack of co-
ordination between regulatory 
bodies 
Disputes with 
environmental and other 
interests 
Financial Over-reliance on French market  Commodity production 
(volatility) 
 Lack of capital French control of 
production 
Biological Toxins (algal blooms etc.) Viruses (herpes etc) 
 Food Safety (Norovirus Ecoli etc)  Environment (storms etc)  
 
Regulatory 
Across all the interviews, the licensing issue was consistently highlighted as the greatest threat to 
oyster businesses within Ireland.    This is because, as one producer explained: ‘Licenses are the 
engine of the whole business.’  Many of the farmers were still struggling either to get their original 
licensed areas legitimised or to get new licenses.   The level of frustration felt by producers when 
trying to resolve their licensing problems was summed up by one producer:  ‘We deal with storms, 
we deal with market collapse, we deal with mortality, we deal with all these things, but for some 
reason these all pale into insignificance compared with the frustration with dealing with the State.’   
The constraint that lack of licensing placed on the growth of businesses was often mentioned: ‘I 
think it [the business] could grow and would grow drastically if the licensing issue was sorted.’ 
Beyond individual businesses it was also seen as detrimental to the wider development of the 
industry:  ‘The whole licensing situation is destroying the industry, hanging there for years and 
years.’  Part of the frustration of producers emerges from a strong feeling that they are not included 
in the discussions over regulation of oyster farming:   ‘The fact is they won’t talk to us, the 
government departments won’t talk to us …’  
The extent of the problem and the level of frustration has begun to manifest itself in a deeply 
embedded distrust of the licensing and other authorities. One respondent’s view, although 
somewhat extreme, illustrates a general feeling expressed by a number of those interviewed: ‘The 
Department of Marine would rather there was no aquaculture.’  In the absence of secure property 
rights, oyster farms have adopted a pragmatic approach to dealing with the licensing problem and 
continued to grow their businesses, but it is recognised that this is not without risk to the business.   
The problem is highlighted by the dilemma facing one farmer:  ‘It is like Catch 22 - they haven’t done 
anything with the license so haven’t come near us so we are fine, but now they are looking at it, that 
is good, but then they are going to tear strips off us.’  
An interesting knock-on effect of the licensing hiatus is that it has actually led to increased numbers 
of license applications, which has exacerbated the problem for the licensing authorities trying to 
work their way through the backlog of applications.  This has emerged because fear of other 
producers getting licenses in prime bays has led to ‘block’ applications for licenses. Under the 
regulations once a license is applied for on a particular site for then no activity can be undertaken on 
the area until the application has gone through the process.  Therefore, by applying, producers 
effectively block others from that area. 
As noted earlier, a particular challenge for aquaculture is the number of bodies at all levels of 
government that have a regulatory interest in the sector.  Irish aquaculture is no exception to this 
with one producer noting that in the bay they were operating there were: ‘thirteen bodies 
responsible for the bay.’  To farmers the problem is not just the sheer number of regulatory bodies, 
but the fact that:  ‘They [Government bodies] don’t talk to each other.. that is what I find is a major 
problem in the industry.. I have to deal with five government bodies rather than just one.’ 
Another dimension of regulatory risk is that the sector is particularly susceptible to wider decisions 
made as to land use and infrastructure within Ireland.  For example, poorly functioning waste 
treatment infrastructure, lack of planning control and attempts to alleviate flooding problems 
further inland (such as the draining of rivers) were all seen as posing a threat to oyster production:  
‘The quality of water has deteriorated in the last couple of years and [the] … county council are the 
biggest threat, they need to understand the consequences of what they do inland and the effect on 
water quality.’ 
In addition to conflicts around the use of water, the nature of Oyster production has led to disputes 
in some areas with environmental groups and other users of the foreshore, in particular leisure 
users.   This arises because of the need for access to the foreshore for tractors and workers and the 
placing of trestles to tether the oyster bags.  Whilst some producers have sympathy for the concerns 
expressed by the environmental lobby, many were highly sceptical of the claims made as to the 
possible negative impact of oyster farming:  ‘I don’t believe we are having an impact on birds as we 
are not destroying their natural habitat.. I don’t think that a tractor and trailer working on the beach 
disturbs them.’    This in part stems from a strong feeling that oyster production has minimal impact: 
‘If we were to remove them [the trestles] tomorrow everything would be exactly the same [as 
before we started farming].   Further, environmentalists have raised concerns about the fact that 
pacific oysters are not native to Ireland and that they are spawning and becoming an invasive 
species.  Again this is contested by producers:  ‘I don’t believe pacific oysters are breeding… it is a 
load of waffle.  The water is too cold and if they were then we would be doing it ourselves and 
collecting the seed.’  
Of course, perceptions as to the extent of the intrusion on the landscape and the impact on the 
environment vary (Hynes et al 2014; Murray and D’Anna, 2015)) and the issue has become highly 
charged with a number of high profile disputes occurring in Ireland.   Again licensing may be seen to 
exacerbate the problem as uncertainties around licensing and hence property rights has led to the 
existence of potential ‘grey areas’ of production which in turn increases tensions around competing 
uses of the foreshore 
Financial Risk  
While oysters may generally be perceived as a luxury item, production in Ireland has actually 
developed along traditional commodity lines with the product generally exported in a bulk form with 
little value added.  For this reason the oyster sector in Ireland is susceptible to the usual vagaries of 
commodity markets and the producers recognise the problem: ‘Price of bulk oysters collapses, big 
incentive to just get rid of them… someone stuck with 500 tonnes has to get rid of them.’   This 
susceptibility is enhanced by the combination of a high level of export dependence and that nearly 
all these exports (just under 90 per cent) are to one market,  France.  Growers are well aware of the 
risks associated with this reliance on the French market in general and a limited number of buyers in 
particular:  ‘That is grand but when the French don’t want them what do you do then.  November, 
December what ... are we going to do? … [they said they would] buy a tonne here and there but only 
half came back.’  
Whilst there is an understanding that improved marketing has a role to play in reducing the reliance 
on the French market, some producers see this as challenging:  ‘There is this idea in Ireland for years 
that we need to brand our own and it is good… As first generation [oyster farmer] I have all the work 
cut out for me to do.  It is an entirely different job, it is a marketing job not a farming job.’  On the 
other hand others argue that marketing should be seen as having primacy:  ‘I see it differently from 
many people who were on about production, production, production and no word about marketing 
... there is no point producing something if you have no market’.   Many though recognise the 
difficulty of breaking the French stronghold on oyster brands:  ‘We do all the work, they [the French 
buyers] don’t do anything.  They wash it, they put it a nice box and re-export as French.  But the 
reality is that the world connoisseur market wants French Oysters.  That is the perception the whole 
perception of French food and that is what you are fighting against.’  
A number of those interviewed for the study saw a lack of capital investment as a risk for their 
businesses (as well as a constraint on the overall growth of the sector).   Whilst a number of reasons 
were cited for the inability to obtain capital, producers saw the licensing issue as being a key factor.   
Unlike in farming where the producer owns the land, in oyster production the license is often the 
main security that producers have.  With no license in place, it is hard for a business to raise capital – 
for example from banks or from outside investors.  In addition, due to Irish legislation, if a producer 
does not have a license they are not able to access EU, or national, rural and other business 
development grants. This places Irish producers at a disadvantage when compared to their French 
counterparts for example.  As one producer highlighted: ‘Most things flow from that [licensing 
problem]…for example expanding and putting in purification … first thing the bank are going to ask 
you for is your licence…what are you going to say? Oh sorry it ran out 2 years ago!’  Another 
producer succinctly reiterates this point: ‘The banks are not going to give you money to throw into 
the sea.’   
The interviews with industry experts highlighted a concern that there was a lack of innovation in the 
oyster industry with production techniques not having developed significantly since the industry was 
established.  There was a fear that this could impact the long run competitiveness of the sector. In 
discussion with producers, the uncertainty of licenses was seen to negatively impact on innovation 
because businesses were either unable or unwilling to invest in new systems or processes.  
Producers also stated that even where licenses were in place they could stifle innovation, because 
the license specifies the system of production to be followed.     To change the system of production 
(for example through adoption of new technologies) would require a new license meaning producers 
would get caught with the whole licensing problem again.   
 
Biological Risk 
The biological nature of oyster production and the fact that they are often eaten in their raw state 
were identified by the interviewees as leading to a range of other risks for producers.   These 
included risks to the oysters themselves (eg increased mortality in seed through viruses or Algal 
blooms) and risks to those who eat oysters (due to toxins or noroviruses etc).   Failure to deal with 
the biological risks was seen to either lead to a reduction in productive capacity or to a loss of 
markets due to food safety breakdowns. Food safety issues, whilst rarer than production problems, 
tend to be high profile and potentially damaging to the industry.  For example, an outbreak of 
norovirus in Hong Kong in 2012 led to the banning of Donegal oysters from that market.     In terms 
of the business the impacts of a failure to cope with the biological risks can clearly be very severe in 
nature as one producer explained: ‘…sales were a little bit down don’t know why …. then seed died 
and then we had product recall over norovirus all within a space of six months and that nearly wiped 
us out - took two years to recover. ‘     
The interviews highlighted that oyster farmers have adopted a range of approaches to deal with 
these threats, some more basic than others.   For example, a common approach adopted in 
response to the high seed mortality levels due to the herpes virus was simply to increase the 
quantity of seed put out.  Other approaches have been to pay more for seed from sources that is 
less likely to be infected and in some cases all producers in a bay have informally worked together to 
try and keep viruses out of the bay by agreeing to all source their seed from safer sources.    
The interviews highlighted how the licensing issue increased the exposure of oyster businesses to 
biological risk both directly and indirectly.   The direct impact emerges from the fact that the 
restrictive nature of licenses (in terms of where and how production can occur) means that it is 
harder to move stock out of harms way from biological threats (for example algal blooms).  
Indirectly, as noted above, the difficulty in raising capital or attaining grants without secure licenses 
mean that firms may be unable to invest in systems that may reduce the risk of food safety 
breakdowns (e.g. improved purification systems).   
 
Discussion 
Vulnerability 
Having outlined some of the key risks faced by the sector, it is necessary to consider further why the 
sector may be particularly vulnerable to these risks.  First, and most obvious, is the issue of uncertain 
property rights.  As farms need a license to produce they are vulnerable to dysfunctional licensing 
system.  Second, many of the firms are first, or at most, second generation. Therefore they have not 
accumulated much capital in the business and much of what has been generated has been 
reinvested so there are very little ‘reserve’ funds to help deal with negative shocks. This means there  
is relatively little capability to deal with the risk compared to the level of vulnerability (Leat and 
Revoredo, 2011). Third, in general, even the larger businesses in Ireland are relatively small scale and 
the overall size of the industry although significant is still small.  The scale and fragmentation of the 
industry makes it hard for individual businesses and the sector to benefit from economies of scale.  
This is particularly the case in areas which incur relatively high fixed costs for producers such as 
investment in purification, wider food safety and quality assurance requirements, logistics and 
marketing efforts.  Fourth, the inability to gain grants make it harder to develop purification and 
packing facilities and therefore make the industry dependent on the French market.  Finally, a 
current weakness in the sector is the lack of mechanisms (for example through regulatory flexibility,  
financial aid or fully functioning insurance tools) to help producers deal with “force majeure” 
situations (for example mass mortalities caused by extreme weather, disease or algal blooms).   
The results highlight a sector that is vulnerable to a range of (inter-related) risks which are 
constraining its development and that regulation is at the heart of the issue.   At one level, it is 
possible to consider how through the use of specific measures the individual risks may be prevented, 
mitigated or coping mechanisms developed. However, a broader issue is whether more fundamental 
changes to the structure of industry are required to make it less susceptible (more resilient) to the 
risks that remain and if so how such structural change could be achieved.  
Risk Management Options 
In terms of considering the risks individually, Table 2 highlights that there are a range of potential 
measures that may prevent, mitigate or help the industry cope with these risks.   The table is not 
meant to be exhaustive in nature but more illustrative of the types of measures available. Whilst 
they are presented separately there are also a clear links (often with feedback) between many of the 
measures.  For example, insurance mechanisms that could reduce financial losses from disease 
outbreaks may also make the industry more attractive to outside investors, increasing the capital in 
the sector which in turn could be used to improve biological control and reduce the risk of disease.    
In relation to the focus of this paper, similar links can be seen between resolving the licensing issue 
and addressing a number of other risks faced by the sector. The table also highlights that there are 
significant roles and responsibilities for both the public and private sectors (individually but often 
collaboratively) in implementing the measures.  
 
  
Table 2: Potential Risk Management Options for the Oyster Industry  
Risk Examples of Options (Prevention, 
Mitigation, Coping (P,M,C)* 
Responsibility Public 
/Private Sector 
Licensing Invest resources in making sure of 
EU compliance (Natura 2000 etc). 
Develop ’One stop shop’ to speed 
up and simplify application 
process P) 
Public 
Lack of co-ordination 
between regulatory bodies 
Co-ordination of regulation (M)   Public 
Reliance on single market  Purification/diversifying 
markets/branding (M, C) 
Private and Public  
Lack of capital Secure Property Rights (tradable 
licenses) (M)  
Private/Public 
Land-use conflicts Marine Spatial Planning (M), 
Enhancement of CLAMS type 
models 
Public/Private/Third 
Sector 
Environmental Use of Triploid seed to reduce 
threat of spawning (M) 
Private 
Volatility Purification/diversifying 
markets/branding (M, C) 
Private/ Public (e.g. 
encouragement of co-
operatives) 
Toxin (Algal Blooms etc) Insurance (C ) / License flexibility 
(C) 
Private/Public 
Food Safety (Norovirus, 
Ecoli etc)  
(Cause) Improved water treatment 
infrastructure, planning (P)  
Public (Irish Water, Local 
Councils) 
  (Symptoms) Improved purification 
processes (P) 
Private  
Public (Research 
funding) 
Viruses (Herpes etc) Insurance ( C )  / Improved 
biosecurity (P)/ Develop domestic 
seed production  (M) 
Private (biosecurity 
measures etc) Public 
(support seed 
development, 
underwrite insurance 
etc) 
Notes: *Prevention: Measures designed to provide permanent protection or reduce the likeliness or intensity of a 
hazardous event so it doesn’t become a disaster.  Mitigation: Measures taken to respond to and manage a 
hazardous event. These measures prepare businesses to act appropriately before, during and after the event. 
Coping: Measures taken to minimize the adverse impacts on the business after a hazard has occurred  
 It should be emphasised that the licensing problem is not simply an Irish one. As the EC (2012) note  
‘It is clear that several of the key constraints relate to the licensing procedures employed in the 
Member States. One of the problems is simply inconsistency – different procedures and approaches 
apply not only as amongst Member States but also within Member States individually. There are also 
common problems in how licensing is carried out – there are typically multiple agencies involved; 
there is often a need to obtain more than one licence or permit; the application procedures are not 
joined up, may take different lengths of time and, cumulatively, the entire process can take several 
years; the outcome of applications is unpredictable; and licences are not issued for sufficient periods 
to promote certainty and investment reliability’ (EU 2009).   However, whilst Ireland is not alone 
within the EU, the licensing difficulties are at the extreme end of the spectrum.    
The requirements of a functioning licensing system are well recognised.  For example in a study for 
the FAO it is noted that ‘The purpose of licensing is to ensure an orderly development of the industry 
with due care taken to minimise negative externalities’ (Hishamunda, 2014).   The Irish 
Government’s view is that this is what is happening: ‘The regulatory procedures in respect of all 
aquaculture activities have never been stronger and represent a good balance between the need to 
develop the Industry and provide the highest level of protection for our marine and coastal 
environment.’   However, as the interviews highlight this is clearly not the perception of those within 
the industry. 
Examples exist within Europe and elsewhere of licensing systems that appear to be functioning more 
effectively.  For example, Norway is often held up as an example of how licensing can be handled 
more efficiently (see Hishamunda et al, 2014 for example).   Here a ‘one stop shop’ approach has 
been adopted and it can take as little as six months to arrive at a definitive response to licensing 
applications.  Ireland is yet to adopt such an approach and the furthest the authorities have got in 
reforming the system is to commission a review of the system (Irish Government).  
Beyond the licensing issue, the difficulty with multiple layers of regulation is again not a situation 
unique to Ireland.  For example the EP (2009) note that ‘It appears to be a fairly common perception 
amongst aquaculture stakeholders that conflict and overlap occurs in aquaculture, although the 
extent to which this occurs is likely to be less than is perceived. The Commission has recognized that 
there is generally a need for better coordination of policies and for some challenges to be dealt with 
at EU, national and local/stakeholder levels’.    In theory  ‘One stop shops’ can be extended beyond 
the issuing of licences such that they enable growers to interact with those that have an ongoing 
regulatory interest in the sector once the license is issued (Hishamunda, 2014).  
The need for integrated approaches to managing the relationship between land and water in the 
bays where oysters are produced is clear due to the potential conflicts that can occur, including 
environmental issues.  This integration needs to be across the regulatory authorities, but also there 
is a need to integrate all the stakeholders that have an interest in the sector (from producers 
through to local interest groups).   Within Ireland, mechanisms exist have been developed that 
attempt this sort of integration.  Co-ordinated Local Aquaculture Management Systems (CLAMS) 
have been established since 1997 (BIM, undated).  Initially they arose to deal with managing salmon 
production in bays but have since expanded in their scope.  The approach adopted for CLAMS is 
described in the Mission Statement as:  ‘The logical management approach is a locally based and all 
embracing system designed to maximise production and environmental management through the 
integration of production goals with minimal conflict with other resource users.  Ireland is leading 
the way in the development of such a unique and progressive approach to bay/inshore waters 
management…This is a constantly evolving process in which a co-ordinated strategy is developed 
and implemented for the allocation of environmental, socio-cultural and institutional resources to 
achieve conservation and sustainable multiple use of the coast.’  (BIM, undated) 
 
On the surface, CLAMS is potentially the forum whereby mediation between different demands on 
the land and water can occur.  However, it is telling that during the interviews with oyster producers 
when the challenges facing them were discussed and solutions considered, CLAMS was not 
mentioned as a possible mechanism.  In addition, it may be reasoned that the level of antagonism to 
the perceived negative impacts of the environmental lobby on the oyster producers business makes 
balancing the competing aims much harder.  To aid the process there is the need for clear Marine 
Spatial Planning strategies, so that the development of oyster farming (and other marine based 
sectors) can be placed in the context of the wider development (and protection) of marine resources 
(Qiu and Jones, 2013, Brennan et al)  
There is a direct link between the resolving of the licensing challenges and measures to deal with 
many of the financial and biological risks facing oyster farming.   For example, any move away from 
the almost total reliance on the French market requires significant investment, particularly in 
purification and marketing capacity.   However, as noted in the results sector, the absence of 
licenses is seen as a major blockage to attracting outside funding either through traditional routes 
such as banks or less traditional ones such as venture capital.  This in itself is an impediment to 
producers being able to make the necessary investment to move away from a dependence on the 
bulk export of oysters to the French market.   
A further advantage of resolving the allocation of licenses is that there becomes the potential to 
make licenses tradeable as appears to be the case in Norway (Hishamunda, 2014).  This creates a 
fungible asset with the potential benefit of attaining access to credit lines, whilst also having the 
potential to facilitate structural change in the sector (this is discussed more fully below).    
Whilst addressing the regulatory failures within the sector has been shown to directly and indirectly 
reduce the risk profile of the sector, it can be seen as necessary but not sufficient to achieving a 
resilient aquaculture sector.   This is in part because a significant number of risk factors will remain 
either in part or in whole.  For example, the propensity for large losses to occur through disease or 
storms etc) which will directly impact on profitability as well as deterring outside investment in the 
sector.   
Mechanisms and measures such as those highlighted in Table 2 are therefore needed to address 
these other risks.  As just one example it may be argued that a fully functioning insurance market 
could make the industry more attractive to outside investment.  Aquacultural insurance has 
attracted interest from international and other bodies (van Anrooy et al, 2006; Stimpson and Co, 
2007)   Whilst private insurance schemes do exist, the challenges facing insurance in this area are 
similar in nature to those facing agriculture but these are exacerbated by the fact that in many cases 
production occurs in the sea.  As noted by the Irish Government ‘Aquaculture insurance is one of the 
tools used in aquaculture risk management, but there is considerable ignorance within the 
aquaculture industry about its availability, the process of obtaining insurance cover, especially on 
aquaculture stock mortality, and the constraints to insurers providing its services (ref Irish 
Government).’  Some recognition of the difficulty has emerged in Ireland and the latest Marine 
Development Plan includes provision for forms of public insurance for such factors as algal blooms 
and loss of seed through viruses.  However, perhaps inevitably due to funding and other constraints, 
the approaches seem limited (for example business can only make one claim during the duration of 
the plan for losses due to algal blooms etc).  If effective insurance policies can be developed these 
may offset some of the natural fear from outside investors in terms of the risks involved with 
investing in the oyster industry.    
Structural Change? 
The previous discussion highlights that for many of the risks there are, with the will and sufficient 
resources, options available to either prevent, mitigate or help the industry cope with the risks.  
However, there are broader questions at the sector level as to how best to ensure the long run 
viability of the industry.  In the next section a more holistic view of the further development of the 
sector is considered in particular the structures needed.  Possible options include forms of co-
operation and collaboration or supporting the development of individual businesses. 
Discussion with those involved in the industry (outside of production), highlights a consensus that 
there are significant opportunities for greater collaboration and cooperation to overcome some of 
the challenges that the sector faces.  The concept of the value-net (or co-opetition) has been 
discussed more generally in an Irish context (see Bord Bia, 2012 for example).3  However, it appears 
nowhere more applicable than in the Irish Oyster industry where there is a relatively new industry 
facing scale and fragmentation challenges that could benefit greatly from increased cooperation 
between members.   
As noted above, many of the costs associated that may decrease the sector’s vulnerability to the key 
risks are fixed in nature (for example purification plants, marketing, quality assurance etc.) and, in 
principle, through cooperation and collaborative efforts these costs could be spread over greater 
levels of production, reducing the cost to each individual business improving not only their 
profitability, but also the competitiveness of the sector as a whole. 
Of course, cooperatives already exist within the sector, for example traditional oyster production is 
characterised by cooperative action.  There are also examples of previous cooperative efforts in 
oyster farming, although their performance was seen as quite mixed by those interviewees who had 
been involved.  From our interviews we also found many examples of more informal collaboration 
amongst producers.  
Recent EU legislation facilitates the establishment of producer organisations in the aquaculture 
sector.   The industry experts interviewed saw a range of potential roles for such structures in the 
Oyster industry which can contribute to either financial (FS) or biological (BS) security including: 
1) Price co-ordination (FS) 
2) Shared marketing (not necessarily a common brand for all Irish production) (FS) 
3) Quality Assurance including ensuring Food Safety through purification etc (BS) 
4) Procurement (FS) 
In addition the relatively low levels of technology currently involved in Oyster production suggest 
that gains can be achieved from the collective funding of research to improve innovation within the 
sector.   
Potentially all the above benefits could be significant for the sector, however, discussion with 
producers highlighted a number of possible challenges to the successful formation of producer 
organisations.  Whilst collaboration is occurring between some of the largest producers (for example 
                                                          
3
 The basic idea of co-opetition is that firms collaborate in areas that enable the industry as a whole to grow, 
thus benefiting all those in the industry whilst still competing in other areas.   
through supporting marketing initiatives in Asia), it is clear that some tensions do exist and they are 
wary of more formal collaboration.  Some of their concerns arise from factors such as: the different 
levels of market orientation (including the development of individual brands); poor experiences with 
cooperative action in the past and; concern that other producers may have lower quality standards 
(particularly when considering shared purification facilities).   Whilst these issues are not 
insurmountable, it is clear that the perceived concerns need to be overcome for Producer 
Organisations to work successfully in this sector.    
As noted earlier, around 15 businesses are estimated to account for 70 per cent of production in 
Ireland.  In a number of other food sectors we have witnessed increasing levels of concentration 
(salmon, poultry, pigs etc) often involving the development of sophisticated contract farming 
relationships.  It is possible to envisage a similar model for the Irish oyster sector where a few large 
businesses emerge that deal with and contract smaller producers to grow the seed (up to various 
stages of development depending on need).  These larger farms could potentially have the resources 
(and more importantly access to finance) to invest in the necessary quality assurance processes, 
purification plants and develop marketing as well.   
There may be a role for the public sector to facilitate this structural change through grants for 
investment or through use of the licensing system. The latter could be explicit through directing the 
allocation process, but also it could occur implicitly through making licenses tradeable.  A tradeable 
license system has the benefits that it could allow an exit strategy for the smaller producers and an 
alternative to contract farming.   
The difficulty for the indigenous producers is that there is no guarantee that they would be able to 
purchase the licenses if they were made tradeable.  More established French firms with sufficient 
capital behind them may be in a better position to purchase the licenses.   This leads to the thornier 
question whether or not the businesses that grow in this process are Irish in origin or foreign (most 
likely French) owned.    
More generally a strategy of supporting particular businesses over others has a number of pitfalls.  
There are the usual problems of identifying who the ‘winners’ are and not disadvantaging emerging 
businesses who have the potential to grow themselves.  In the interviews there was a perception 
amongst smaller producers that this was already the case that this was already the case with larger 
producers being favoured at their expense. 
As individual producers get bigger and stronger, it may be reasoned that it makes co-operative 
strategies such as the formation of producer organisations less viable as the key players are likely to 
need them less.   It may be argued that because of this, a mixed approach that tries to support the 
largest producers whilst pushing for producer cooperatives may not be entirely consistent and 
therefore likely to fail. 
Conclusions 
This paper has examined the development of the Irish Oyster industry as an example of the 
challenges facing the development of the aquaculture sector more generally in many regions of the 
world.  It highlights the vulnerability of the Irish Oyster industry to a range of risks but identifies 
regulatory failure, particularly in the form of a dysfunctional licensing system, as one of the greatest 
risks to the orderly development of the industry.   It also highlights clearly how regulatory risk 
interacts at a number of levels with other risks faced by producers leading to greater levels of these 
risks.  It was argued therefore that resolving the licensing issue and improving regulation more 
broadly can potentially allow the industry to grow in Ireland.   However, it is also clear that other 
constraints need to be addressed (that is many risks will remain).   At one level there are approaches 
and measures that can be taken that address the identified risks individually, many of these have 
been applied successfully in other situations and could be successful within an Irish context 
(Hishamunda, 2014; OECD, 2009, FAO code for responsible fisheries).  At another level, a more 
holistic view of the industry needs to be taken which relates to its overall governance.   It is clear 
that due to the vulnerability of the sector at a clear strategy needs to be developed and followed 
through to support the structural changes necessary to ensure that the sector not only survives but 
has the possibility to thrive and take advantage of the opportunities that exist.    
On one level, clear principles have been established as to the characteristics of good governance.   
Hishamunda et al (2014, p1) note ‘The challenge of aquacultural governance is to ensure that the 
right measures are implemented to ensure environmental sustainability without destroying 
entrepreneurial initiatives and social harmony.’  They proceed to argue that ‘over-regulation 
destroys entrepreneurial initiative and motivation – the very ingredients necessary for successful 
commercial aquaculture’ (p20).  However, it is clear that putting good governance into practice is 
not straightforward.  
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